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I  would  like  to  relate  to  you  some  recent  innovations  in  the
theory  of entitlements,  expand  on  the  framework  in  which  they
were developed,  and  apply these ideas to  the  problem of land  use
conflicts.
You  might  expect  a  welfare  economist  to  say,  "Find  the
efficient solution and then implement  it in such a way that everyone
is  better  off."  But  that  is  not  a  satisfactory  approach  to  land
use conflicts.  It ignores the possible ambiguity of the original situa-
tion  and  the  frequent  unmeasurability  of  significant  costs  and
benefits  related  to land  uses.
This  ambiguity  is  illustrated  by  the  conflicts  surrounding  pes-
ticides.  If farmers  expect  to  use  DDT because  that  is  the  most
effective  pest  killer,  while  bird  fanciers  expect  that  people  will
not be allowed to act in a way that endangers  the survival  of birds,
then someone  is going to  be  disappointed.  Once  we  discover  the
connection  between  bird deaths and  DDT,  we cannot  escape  the
choice,  implicitly  or explicitly,  between letting birds  die or lower-
ing  agricultural  productivity.  The  actors  involved,  bird  fanciers
and farmers,  may have been unaware  of any conflict between their
expectations,  but  now  that  the  conflict  is  known,  someone  must
inevitably  be  disappointed.  We  need  a  theory  of how  to  avoid
disappointing people,  and how to decide  whom to disappoint  when
we  cannot or do  not avoid  it.
The  problem  of unmeasurable  benefits  also  applies  to  DDT.
How  can  we  discover  the  value  of  the  survival  of  a  species  of
birds?  There  is no  market  in  which  a person can  buy  species  sur-
vival.  What  possible  practical  meaning  could  there  be,  then,  in  a
statement  that  the  survival  of woodlarks  is  worth  X  dollars?  We
need  a theory of appropriate  social behavior that  does not depend
on  the  concept  of measurable  value.
The  framework  that  I  shall  apply  to  these  problems  of  land
use  conflicts  has developed  from  the  analysis  of Professor  Guido
Calabresi  of Yale  Law  School  in  his  book,  The  Costs of Acci-
dents. Calabresi divides costs into three categories:  primary costs,
the  loss  of  life  and  property  in  accidents,  plus  the  expenses  of
avoiding accidents; secondary  costs, the  losses we feel when costs
are borne by  persons whom  we feel should  not have to bear them,
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blameless;  and tertiary  costs, the costs of administering  a system
of allocating  the  costs of accidents.
Methods  of  dealing  with  accident  costs  are  analyzed  by
Calabresi in terms of their impacts on other costs and on the alloca-
tion  of costs  to  different  persons.  He  divides  rules  that  might
be  used  to  limit  accident  costs  into  "specific  deterrents"  and
"general deterrents."  A  specific  deterrent  is  a prohibition  against
a particular activity,  such as  speeding or running red lights.  A gen-
eral deterrent  is  a  rule that  a  person  who  engages  in  a  particular
activity  must  pay  the  resulting  costs.  It  might  seem  that  general
deterrents  would  always  be  more  efficient,  since  they  permit
people  to  value  individually  the  benefits  of engaging  in  activities
that  may result  in accidents.  But our inability  to  price  all the con-
sequences  of accidents  and our unwillingness  to make  others  sub-
ject  to  accidents  just  because  one  person  is  willing  to  risk  the
consequences  lead  us to favor  specific deterrents  in  some  circum-
stances.
Even  if we  have  settled  on  the type  of deterrent  to  be  used,
a  very  difficult  question  that  remains  is  to  whom  it  is  to  apply.
When  an  accident  occurs,  typically  a  number  of persons  might
have  prevented  it.  In  the  case  of an  accident  between  a  car  and
a pedestrian, there are the auto manufacturers,  the highway  design-
ers, the traffic  policemen,  the driver,  and the pedestrian,  to name
just  a few.  In  some  situations  we  might  want  to  add the  driver's
boss or mother-in-law.  If we single out one group,  such  as drivers,
to  hold  responsible,  then  all  other  groups  lose  the  incentive  to
avoid  accidents  that  comes  from  being  held  accountable.  Such
groups  may  still  have  some  incentive  to  avoid  accidents  though,
either because,  like pedestrians,  they  may  be subject  to costs  that
are  not fully  compensated,  or,  like  auto  manufacturers,  they  may
have  an economic  relationship  with  the  group  held  accountable,
in which relationship accident-avoiding  behavior may be rewarded.
It  is  also  possible  that  the  group  held  accountable  (drivers)  will
pass  the  costs  on  to  some  other  group  (insurance  companies),  in
which  case  the  economic  incentives  to  avoid  accidents,  if  any,
are those which  insurance  companies  place  upon  drivers.
You  might  think  the  solution  would  be  to  decide  the  fault
of each  accident  separately,  but  that  encounters  two difficulties.
The first is the  high tertiary  (administrative)  costs of case-by-case
decisions.  The  second  is  the  unpredictability  of  the  outcome.
A person who had to decide  how  much accident-avoiding  behavior
was  worthwhile  would  want  to  consider  both  the  likely  accident
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tives  are  diluted  in  a  similar  fashion  when  we  spread  the  costs
of an  accident  among  several  parties.  And  if we  were  to  charge
the  full cost of an accident  to each of the  parties that might  have
avoided  it,  we  would  generate  an  inefficient  multiple discourage-
ment of the  activities  that  might  be  charged  with accidents.  The
best  we  can  do  in  these  complex  circumstances  is  to  make  an
informed guess concerning  who is the  best cost avoider,  or, failing
that,  who  is  best  able  to  identify  the  best  cost  avoider  and  pass
the cost on to that  party.
A  longer summary  and  critique  of Calabresi's  framework  can
be found in Frank Michelman's  review  in the  February  1971  Yale
Law Journal, in  which  he  transfers  a  variety  of Calabresi's  con-
cepts  to  the  problem  of pollution.  For example,  he  suggests  that
general  deterrence,  applied  to  pollution,  would  be  a  rule  that  a
polluter must pay the  costs caused by his pollution,  while  specific
deterrence  would  be  represented  by  decisions  that  in  some  cases
pollution  may  not continue  without  compensation,  while  in  other
cases  pollution  must cease.
An article by  Calabresi  and  A.  Douglas Melamed  in the  April
1972  Harvard Law  Review  includes  a  discussion  of pollution  in
a  different  vocabulary.  What  Michelman  described  as  specific
deterrence  is  described  by  Calabresi  and  Melamed  as  "entitle-
ments  protected  by  property  rules,"  while  "general  deterrence"
has  become  "entitlements  protected  by  liability  rules."  Thus  if
a  polluter may  be  stopped  by  an  injunction  sought  by  a pollutee,
the  pollutee  has  an entitlement  to  be  free  of pollution,  protected
by  a  property  rule.  Pollution  may  occur  only  if  the  pollutee  is
compensated  to  his satisfaction.  If the polluter may pollute  unless
the  pollutee  gives  him acceptable  compensation  not to,  then  the
polluter has  an entitlement  protected by a  property rule.  If a pol-
luter may be sued for damages but not enjoined, then the pollutee
has  an  entitlement  protected  by  a  liability  rule.  Calabresi  and
Melamed  mention  a  fourth  possibility,  which  Michelman  over-
looked.  If pollution  may be enjoined  through action  by a pollutee,
but  the  polluter  must  be  compensated,  then  the  polluter  has  an
entitlement  to pollute,  protected  by  a liability  rule.
Calabresi  and  Melamed  also  discuss  "inalienable  entitle-
ments,"  such  as  the  right  not  to  be  a  slave.  Such  entitlements
add  a new  dimension  to the  set  of possibilities they  discuss.  The
fundamental  dichotomy  here  is  between  entitlements  that require
specific  majority approval  in  some  form for transaction  and those
that  do  not.
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forcement directed by some collective decision.  With some entitle-
ments  this  enforcement  can  be  redirected  by  contract  (following
property  rules)  or  by  courts  (following  liability  rules)  without
further  collective  decisions.  An  entitlement  is  "inalienable"  if a
new  collective  decision  is  required  to  redirect  the  enforcement.
I  have  an  alienable  entitlement  to  live  in  my  house  because  the
police  can  be redirected  from keeping  others  out of my house  to
keeping  me out,  by the  process  of sale.  But  I have  an inalienable
entitlement  not  to  have  marijuana  in  my  cigarettes,  because  no
matter  what  I  do  to  avoid  this  entitlement,  the  police  will  still
try  to  keep  the  marijuana  out.  My  entitlement  can  be  alienated
only by a process that includes a new collective decision.  So rather
than call the  entitlement  "inalienable,"  we  might more  accurately
call it an entitlement that is protected by a requirement of collective
assent, or,  to be brief,  a  "collective  entitlement."
Once the  idea of new collective  decisions is introduced,  differ-
ent varieties of collective entitlements  can be identified.  Returning
to  the  pollution  example,  a  collective  entitlement  protected  by  a
property rule could be illustrated  by a situation  in which a polluter
could not  pollute unless he paid a fee acceptable  to those involved
in  the  collective  decisions.  The  crucial  difference  between  this
case  and  an  individual  entitlement  protected  by  a  property  rule
is  that  with  the  collective  entitlement  some  individuals  may  be
required  to  accept  compensation  which  they  personally  feel  is
inadequate.  A  collective  entitlement  protected  by  a  liability  rule
would involve a court determining the appropriate  fee for polluting.
In  this case the collectivity  has no role  in the decision.
Polluter entitlement  protected  by  a  property  rule  would  allow
a polluter  to pollute  unless  the collectivity  decided  to order com-
pensation  that was  acceptable  to  him.  Here  individuals  could  be
coerced  to  participate  in compensation  which they personally  felt
was  excessive.  Polluter  entitlement  protected  by  a  liability  rule
would mean that if the collectivity offered to a polluter compensa-
tion considered adequate by a court, the polluter would be required
to  accept  it  and  desist.  Here  again  individuals  could  be  coerced
to  participate  in what they felt was  excessive  compensation.
Entitlements  that  are  protected  by  liability  rules  are  subject
to  coercive  transfer.  When we  compensate  an  accident victim  or
a person  whose property  is  taken by  eminent  domain for a public
project, we do not insist that the person whose entitlement is taken
be satisfied.  We say that these entitlements  are protected  by liabil-
ity rules, permit courts to determine compensation coercively,  and
risk disappointment  of the holders of entitlements.
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coercion than  liability  rules,  in that the compensation  must  satisfy
a criterion of collective  rather than judicial acceptability.  The hold-
ers  of the  entitlement  that  is  transferred  participate  through  the
collective  decision  process,  which  can  reasonably  be  regarded  as
imposing  less  coercion  than  liability  rules,  unless  the  collective
decision  process  is  totally  unresponsive  to  individual  value.  By
accepting the coercive transfer of collective  entitlements,  a society
gains  a potential  for transactions  in  entitlements  which  would be
almost  impossible  if  unanimous  consent  (property  rules-the
absence  of coercion)  were required.  To illustrate  the  potential and
some  of the  problems  of collective  entitlements,  I  will  elaborate
a proposal for applying them  to land use  conflicts.
Before  making the  proposal,  I  should  say  a  few  words  about
the judgments  involved  in  deciding  to  have  rules  about  entitle-
ments.  In  the  area  of land  use  there  seems  to  be  considerable
uncertainty  about  entitlements,  in other words,  uncertainty  about
how  the  courts  and  the  executive  branches  of government  will
direct  the police  to behave.  By establishing rules for entitlements,
we  can  eliminate  some  future  disappointments  and  some  ineffi-
ciency  that arises from uncertainty.  But the  establishment of rules
generates  secondary  costs.  If we  do  not  establish  rules,  conflicts
will  still  be  resolved  as  they  arise,  one  by  one.  And  the judges
and juries who would resolve these conflicts would be able to make
each  decision  according  to what  they  felt  was  fair,  unhampered
by  the  need  to be  consistent  with established  rules  that may  not
have  adequately  anticipated  the  peculiarities  of individual  cases.
If we  decide  to  have  rules,  we  are  deciding  that  such  secondary
costs  are  less  significant  than the  savings  in  primary  and tertiary
costs  that  come  from  being  able  to  predict  the  outcome  of the
judicial  process.
So  assuming  that  we  want  to  have  some  rules,  what  should
the  rules  be?  Permit  me to  ignore  the problem  of injustice  in  the
transition  to  the  rules  and  concentrate  on  the  operation  of the
rules after they  have  been initiated.
I propose to require a plan for the use of each site.  Each owner
would  have  a  property  entitlement  to  carry  out  the  activities
described  in his  plan as long  as the  consequences  of his activities
were only those  which had  been foreseen  (more on foreseeability
later).  There would be  a collective  property entitlement  to be free
of undesired activities not specified in a person's plan. There would
have to be rules about changes that could be made without permis-
sion,  such  as  planting different  flowers  in one's garden,  and  prob-
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a  room  might  require  permission,  as  it  now  does  in  places  that
require  building  permits.  The  trade-off here  is  between  primary
and  tertiary  costs.  In  deciding  what  changes  require  permission
we  must  balance  the  costs  of filing  for changes  against  the losses
from  allowing changes  without permission.
A  person  who  wished  to  make  a change  in  his  land  use  plan
that was not automatically permitted would be required to state the
negative  consequences  that  could  be  expected  from  the  change.
When negative consequences that had not been predicted occurred
(when there  was a "land  use accident"),  the person whose  action
generated the negative  consequences would be held liable for dam-
ages.  This rule reflects  a judgment that persons  who want to make
changes  are  better  able  to foresee  the  consequences  than  anyone
else.  By  announcing  the  consequences  proponents  of  changes
could  guarantee  that  their  entitlements  would  not  be  affected  by
those  consequences.  Assigning  liability  to  the  proponents  of
change  also  reflects  a  judgment  that  to  the  extent  that  conse-
quences of change  are speculative,  the proponents are  more likely
to be  able to  make good  speculations  than anyone  else.
Making the  remedy liability  for damages rather than the retrac-
tion  of permission  would  mean  that  a  person  who  misjudged  the
consequences  of his  changes  would not  face  the  threat  of having
to ransom  his whole  investment back from  a disgruntled collectiv-
ity.  This  would also mean  that collectivities  would have  to insure
themselves  on the difference  between  property rights and  liability
rights.  This  would make them more reluctant to  approve changes,
but proponents of changes might reduce that reluctance by offering
convincing  evidence  that unforeseen  consequences  were unlikely.
Except  for  accidental  consequences,  entitlements  in  land  use
would be protected by property rules. Transactions  in entitlements
would  require  mutual consent of an owner and a collectivity.  For
the collective  decisions that must be made I propose special voting
rules  related  to  the  estimated  distribution  of  the  impacts  of
changes.
Changes  in  land  use  have  spatial  and  nonspatial  effects.  An
example  of nonspatial  effects  is the opposition  to the trans-Alaska
pipeline  by  persons  who  will  never see  it,  or  opposition  to  DDT
by  persons  concerned  with  the  survival  of birds  they  will  never
see or hear.  Nonspatial effects  related to shared values would pro-
duce little or no controversy.  Nonspatial effects related to minority
values  pose  very  difficult  problems  that  will  not  be  discussed  in
this  paper.
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nant  external  effects  of changes  in  land  use,  I will rely  on  a pre-
sumption that tastes  are  reasonably  similar.  Persons  with unusual
tastes  will suffer  at  the hands  of the  majority,  but  the  protection
of all unusual tastes  would  require the cessation  of change.  If we
wish  to  permit  some  changes  in  land  use,  we  must  decide  that
persons  who  have  tastes  in  land  use  that  are  not  protected  by
majority  action  are the  best cost  avoiders  with respect  to  injuries
to  their interests.
A  transaction  in  land  use  entitlements  would  occur  upon
approval  of the person  whose  land  use  plan  was  to  change,  and
an appropriate  weighted  majority of the  surrounding  residents and
property  owners,  with compensation  possible  in  either direction.
Votes  and  compensation  payments  would  be  weighted  by
estimated  effects.
I cannot  say exactly  how  weights  should  be chosen,  but  I can
describe  how  the  weighting  could  be  improved  over  time,  as
experience  with  the  system  was  gained.  Voters  could  be  sorted
by any characteristic that was thought to be related to the intensity
of effects  of land  use  changes  (age,  years  of residence,  distance
from  the  site  where  use  was  to  change),  and  the  voting  pattern
examined  for systematic  differences  in the probability  of approval
with  respect  to  that characteristic.  When  it could  be  established
that  some  group  was  less  likely  to  approve  than  average,  their
weight  would  be  increased  in  future  votes.  The  size  of the  area
over  which  votes  would  be  held  would be  adjusted  over time  by
the  rule  that  the  size  was  large  enough  when  the  probability  of
approval  among  voters just inside  the district  was  average,  even
though  the  compensation  involved  was  "small."  I  believe  that
for  many  controversial  changes  in  land  use  the  area  of  impact
is  very  small.
The number of votes  required for approval  could be  half,  two-
thirds, or any other proportion.  The higher the required  majority,
the  more  likely  it  will be  that  basically  desirable  changes  will  be
thwarted  for lack  of the needed majority.  The  lower the required
majority,  the  more  likely  it  will  be  that  minorities  with  unusual
tastes  would  suffer  from  majority  domination.  (In  contemplating
the  fate  of persons  who  must  accept  changes they  voted  against,
we  should  bear  in  mind  that  a  "no"  vote  could  be  a  strategic
hold-out  for  more  compensation.  A  person  might  be  worse  off
with the  change only  in the  sense that his expectation  of gain  was
not fulfilled.)
A transaction  would typically  begin  with  an offer from  a  land-
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land use  plan,  or  an offer to change  his plan in  a way  he  believes
would be of value to others,  in return for compensation.  Whoever
proposed  the  transaction  would  have  to  pay  at  least  part  of the
voting  cost,  and  the  landowner  would  have  to  agree  in  advance
to be bound to the transaction if it should be collectively approved.
The  voting  authorities would  allocate  the  potential compensation
(positive  or  negative)  among  voters,  and  a  vote  would  then  be
taken,  perhaps  by  mail.  If the  necessary  majority  approved,  the
transaction  would be final unless overturned  by the same process.
Compensation  would be paid or received by all voters, irrespective
of how they voted.
Precautions  against the buying of votes would  have to be taken
since  if  a bare  majority  approved  because  of the  side  payments
they received,  the dissatisfied  minority  would be  subject  to losses
not offset by other  gains.
At the  beginning of this paper I  said I would depart from tradi-
tional welfare  economics  in which money is the standard by which
costs  and benefits  are  combined.  And now  I  have  suggested  that
land  use  entitlements  be  traded  for  money.  Have  I  reneged  on
my bargain? I believe not. Whenever enough people (as determined
by the voting rules) felt that costs could not be monetized,  transac-
tions would not occur.  And I do not claim that the proposed system
is  efficient.  I  suggest  only  that  in  a difficult  class  of problems  in
which  we cannot  measure  the  values  of individuals  in  money and
must  inevitably  disappoint  some  persons,  the  proposal  offers  a
hope  of  giving  what  would  be  regarded  as  decent  consideration
to  the  values of all affected  persons.
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